Ever since Ukraine and Moldova embarked on their official EU integration process in 2022, the possibility of the new candidates “jumping the queue” has created uneasiness in the Western Balkans. Although the push for their EU accession was the result of an outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the relatively quick pace with which these countries have moved so far has not always been received warmly by the long-standing Balkan candidates.
Nevertheless, this “race” is largely immaterial for several reasons, say EWB interlocutors. Firstly, the prospects of fast-tracking the entire process, especially the candidacy of Ukraine, are slim. Secondly, Ukraine and Moldova have so far only gone through the easier part, and the real work begins now. Finally, a stronger momentum for EU enlargement, despite encouraging signals, is still not guaranteed.
Ukraine and Moldova applied for European Union membership weeks after the start of the Russian invasion in 2022 and received candidate status in June of the same year. The European Council officially decided to open their accession talks in December 2023, while at the same time granting a candidate status to Georgia.
The relative speed with which the new Eastern European candidates advanced was soon contrasted with the state of the accession of the Western Balkan candidates.
North Macedonia and Albania opened their accession negotiations only in July 2022 after years of delay. Bosnia and Herzegovina received the status of a candidate country six months after Ukraine and Moldova, and the opening of its accession negotiations is still pending, while Kosovo is not recognized as a candidate. Montenegro and Serbia have not made a formal step forward in years.
Narratives of “unfair treatment” creep into the Western Balkans
In September 2023, the Financial Times reported that “some Western Balkan leaders are growing increasingly frustrated that Ukraine is leapfrogging their countries in the EU accession process”. Later that year, POLITICO published a statement from the Serbian Minister for European Integration assessing that the EU did not react as fast with the Western Balkans as it did with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.
There were also harsher assessments of the situation, with some media in the Western Balkans reporting that it was unfair that countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina are left in the waiting room, while the countries in Eastern Europe, whose territorial integrity is undermined, are advancing.
Unsurprisingly, Russian officials and the state’s media outlets also exploited these divisions, with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov commenting last September that the EU was “admitting the Nazis out of turn, while Serbia, Turkey and others will wait”.
Reacting to the narratives in this month’s interview, Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi said that “it is not a good idea to try to create a race between the Western Balkans and Ukraine” and that “the conditions are the conditions, and they have to be applied equally to every single candidate”.
However, not everybody still believes that this should be the case. According to the recently published Munich Security Report, 75% of Ukrainians believe that the EU should fast-track Ukraine’s EU membership application “even if that means lowering its standards for joining”. The report, however, notes the disagreements within the European Union over the issue and is cautious about this prospect.
Fast-tracking the process not very likely
Interlocutors of our portal agree that expectations should be managed. Natasha Wunsch, Professor of European Studies at the University of Fribourg, says that is important to remember that starting the accession was primarily a symbolic gesture of solidarity towards Ukraine. The eventual enlargement negotiations, she adds, are likely to take at least a decade and cannot begin in earnest before the military confrontation with Russia has been resolved.
“Despite fears among Western Balkan countries that Kyiv might ‘jump the queue’, several member states have expressed strong reservations over such an outcome and, if anything, a grouped enlargement of the Western Balkans and Ukraine, possibly along with Moldova and Georgia, could be envisaged in a 10-15-year horizon”, says Wunsch, who is also a member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG).
Teona Lavrelashvili, Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, also doubts that Ukraine will join the European Union earlier than some of the countries in the Western Balkans for several reasons, including the fact that the country is engaged in a war.
“Additionally, Ukraine’s accession, with its population of 44 million, would inevitably impact the institutional and budgetary dynamics of the Union. This brings into question the timing and nature of necessary reforms, such as those in the Common Agricultural Policy and Cohesion Funds. The direction and pace of these reforms are uncertain and will largely depend on the Union’s next leadership”, she says.
According to Lavrelashvili, the 2024 European Parliament elections are anticipated to witness a significant shift to the right, with populist radical right parties gaining traction, which could potentially affect enlargement, as well as support for Ukraine.
“Although the enlargement process has become much more political and geopolitical, managing expectations regarding Ukraine’s EU accession timeline will be crucial to avoid disillusionment”, Lavrelashvili says.
Speed of the first accession steps not a reliable indicator
It is even questionable whether the accession process of Ukraine and Moldova thus far can be viewed as particularly fast. Adnan Ćerimagić, Senior Analyst at the European Stability Initiative, points out that, back in the day, countries like Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Croatia went through the same phases equally quickly, or even faster.
He says that the two key tests for the EU will now be what happens next.
“First, is there a clear political commitment to bring Ukraine and Moldova to the next goal? Will this be a real goal of finalizing talks and becoming full members of the EU or at least membership in its Single Market and four freedoms? Or will it be an empty goal of opening 33 chapters that might take eight more years, which was the case for Montenegro, or longer than a decade as it will be the case for Serbia?”, Ćerimagić asks.
The second big test will be if the EU will be willing to replicate its approach to Ukraine and Moldova in the Western Balkans.
“What we have seen so far is less than encouraging. European Commission’s approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina is in stark contrast to what we have seen with Ukraine and Moldova. Take the condition of adoption of the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis. In the case of Ukraine, unlike Bosnia, the Commission has not put it as a condition for the start of accession talks. This is because even for non-federalised countries this document is an enormous and difficult task”, Ćermigaić points out.
Western Balkans also responsible for the pace of their accession process
Some observers, however, assess that, in addition to the different approach the EU has towards Ukraine and Moldova, the Western Balkan countries are also responsible for the slow pace of their accession process.
According to Kurt Bassuener, Senior Associate at the Democratization Policy Council, the current differential between Eastern European candidates and the Western Balkans is one of actual political will to implement the necessary reforms.
“The relative lack of delivery for most of the Western Balkans speaks volumes”, he says.
He adds that the EU has helped engender this attitude of most Western Balkan politicians, by engaging in “happy talk” for years, declaring progress that has a tenuous connection to reality, as he says, in the vain hope that it will become real over time.
“There is a deeper problem: the fact that by and large the political elites of these countries generally don’t want the standards of transparency and accountability contained in the acquis – it would destroy their business model”, Bassuener says.
He also assesses that the popular constituency for the EU as a community of values drove positive change in Ukraine, despite its still evident challenges. On the other hand, in the Western Balkans, the EU has never foregrounded itself as a community of values, but more transactionally.
“If there is to be real progress, that is what it will take – a values-based alliance between the EU’s democrats and those in the region. There may be a chance for a fundamental rethink with the next Commission, but nothing is assured”, Bassuener concludes.
Is the momentum for enlargement really there?
The start of the accession process of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia has at least made the EU seriously think about enlargement, which previously seemed to be in a state of deep freeze. Last year, proposals were made by some EU leaders, including Charles Michel, that the Union should be ready to accept new members by 2030. Suggestions were also put forward by the governments of France and Germany on how to reform institutions in this context.
Are these signs enough to conclude that there is indeed a political momentum for enlargement? Without it, the question of who will join first – Western Balkan or Eastern European candidates – becomes irrelevant.
Teona Lavrelashvili believes that, while there has been a remarkable shift in the EU’s enlargement policy, sustaining this momentum is not guaranteed.
“The prevailing narrative suggests a need for institutional and governance reforms to accommodate new members. However, I believe this discourse masks a deeper lack of political will for enlargement. While reform may be essential for integrating all nine candidates, including Ukraine, it is not as critical for the accession of smaller countries, such as Montenegro, with its population of just over half a million”, she says.
Natasha Wunsch agrees that enlargement is newly visible as a policy at the European level, but says that the EU will be facing many other challenges in the years to come.
“There is a consensus that the admission of as large a country as Ukraine, or another grouped enlargement, will require prior institutional adjustments most likely in the form of a treaty change, which further distances the prospect of a swift conclusion of the enlargement process with Ukraine or any other of the current candidate countries”, she says.
It seems that, rather than worrying about who will enter the European Union first, all candidates should make further efforts to convince the EU that enlargement should remain near the top of its agenda in 2024 and beyond.