Originally published on the BiEPAG blog.
The Western Balkans’ European integration had a very good start of the week, firstly with the Berlin Process Summit (October 14) which brought a new CRM action plan, a breakthrough in CEFTA implementation, several new agreements and commitments; and later on, in Luxemburg (October 15) with the kickstart of EU negotiations with Albania on Cluster 1 chapters at the 2nd Inter-Governmental Conference.
In late September 2024, the Government of Albania called upon the Parliament to review the country’s negotiation position, with use of an expedited procedure. The document was not made public and civil society calls for a public hearing on the matter at the National European Integration Council, an advisory body of the Parliament, were ignored. The news caught the Albanian public somewhat off guard given the low expectations following the European Council’s conclusions in June, which made no mention of Albania’s bid. Yet, many had already heard whispers in the EU corridors about the decoupling of Albania and North Macedonia being unavoidable and even imminent, however unfair to the Macedonians.
“I must confess that I feel sad that our brothers from North Macedonia couldn’t enter this stage although they’ve been the first ones to start the process” – Albanian PM Edi Rama said at a press conference with Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi and Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Péter Szijjártó. Rama further referred to what he labeled as a “humiliation”, for being denied the start of accession talks with the EU three times in a row. “And yet I feel a bit awkward because I also think about the humiliation of North Macedonia which even changed its name in order to start this [process]. So, yes, I stand by what I’ve said about our Bulgarian friends, because history can be no reason to stop negotiations of any country”.
While PM Edi Rama declared that his ambition is for Albania to meet all objectives and benchmarks for accession by 2030, the leader of the Democratic Party (DP) Sali Berisha praised the opening of negotiations from his house arrest, but also emphasized that “Albania meets no criteria other than the geostrategic one for sitting in the negotiation table with EU”. Jorida Tabaku, DP’s former deputy minister of Integration and current chair of the parliamentary committee for European affairs underlined the support for opening EU negotiations, in spite of the fact that “Albania today is far from a country which meets the criteria”. On the other hand, the EU ambassador in Albania congratulated Albanians for this major step forward in their country’s EU accession journey.
The second IGC with Albania on October 15 in Luxemburg presented EU’s common position on Cluster 1 chapters and areas. While recognizing progress made so far and relevance of reform measures and commitments to deepen reforms, the EU’s position sets interim benchmarks that need to be met before the next steps in the negotiation process. Interestingly, the EU seems to ignore Albania’s plea for accelerated accession, which is presented from the outset of the 160-page document submitted by the Government to Brussels. Albania’s request for such procedure puts forward measures that the country is ready to undertake in some of the Cluster 1 chapters and areas in order to expedite its accession process. Yet, the EU’s common position does not refer to the accelerated accession procedure and instead sets interim benchmarks that the country is required to meet.
These benchmarks are in fact much more ambitious than the ones Albania “offers” in return for a “speedy accession”. For example, while Albania’s negotiation position proposes measures such as “publishing notices in EU’s tender platform” or “engaging as observer in various EU expert and advisory groups” as an approach for accelerated integration under Chapter 5, the EU’s common position suggests more ambitious targets such as “full alignment with EU acquis on concessions and public private partnerships” which have been the source of colossal corruption in the last decade. Comparing the two documents – Albania’s and EU’s negotiation position – it is clear that Brussels, in its 27-page long document expects Albania to be more courageous and concrete compared to the vagueness of its lengthy negotiation position. Most importantly, Brussels sends a strong signal to Albania that it will stand firmly behind processes that transform meaningfully and bring Albania closer to EU. Brussels heralds that it will not be tricked by Albanian politics under the pretext of deepening the justice reform for which the EU’s common position is clear – independence, efficiency, integrity, meritocracy and accountability will be sustained by the new justice institutions rather than by special parliamentary committees.
Yet, Albanian citizens, civil society and other domestic stakeholders should not assume that EU negotiations will magically consolidate Albanian democracy and institutions for them. EU accession negotiations will provide a succinct roadmap of benchmarks, extra layers of monitoring and even “cash for reforms”. However, this process cannot guarantee success nor sustainability without the key ingredient – a watchful and vibrant society of citizens who keep governments accountable, participate meaningfully and continually in decision-making and seek nothing less than full respect for democratic principles, integrity of institutions and governance processes.