Originally published on BiEPAG blog
The country report for Kosovo was launched amidst a grim atmosphere and strained relations between Kosovo and the EU, with the former being almost completely isolated by the EU. The EU integration process for Kosovo is currently at a critical juncture. Kosovo is the only country in the enlargement regions without candidate status, and the likelihood of a response to its membership application submitted in 2022 seems increasingly distant. This is due not only to the EU’s leadership transition but also to the lack of political will within the EU to engage with non-recognizing member states and the reluctance of key member states to address Kosovo’s candidacy politically.
Discussing EU candidate status for Kosovo almost feels like a luxury topic, especially as the primary focus now is lifting the so-called “reversible measures” imposed in 2023—which, due to obstacles from certain member states, appear quite irreversible. Nonetheless, this situation offers the High Representative a unique opportunity to recommend lifting these measures—likely knowing the recommendation may be ignored. It places responsibility back on the member states and further highlights the EU’s inability and unwillingness to properly address the issue it has created.
Clearly, the measures have exacerbated the already strained relations between the EU and Kosovo, often leading to stark and conflicting statements. Stuck in limbo, it is still being determined how EU-Kosovo relations will further evolve. Such circumstances are detrimental to the overall internal demand for EU integration reforms and civil society’s immense work to pursue this agenda.
Under these circumstances, a key question arises: will the limited progress in certain areas, as noted by the EU, influence Kosovo’s path toward EU integration? The answer appears to be no—for both the lifting of measures and candidate status—as they are politically blocked and unlikely to advance, regardless of the report’s assessment of reforms. Let’s talk about EU-related reforms regardless. One of the main issues in the rule of law reforms is the vetting process for judges and prosecutors. During the first two years of the Kurti government, this topic led to friction between Kosovo and the EU, primarily due to the approach the government intended to take, which the EU did not endorse. The opinion of the Venice Commission has addressed this matter in its review of the Concept Paper on the Vetting of Judges and Prosecutors and draft amendments to the Constitution, and the Constitutional Court of Kosovo provided an opinion on the matter.
However, this issue has been largely ignored in the EU Country Report for Kosovo, with the Kosovo government and the EU seemingly pretending it doesn’t exist or isn’t on the government’s agenda. Despite limited progress in fundamentals, the report notes that there has been positive momentum in addressing corruption cases, including at higher levels, along with improvements in Kosovo’s track record—an area closely watched even in the context of the visa liberalisation roadmap.
A notable addition to the reform process is the inclusion of specific recommendations for each chapter, which helps guide the government in making improvements and supports civil society in monitoring their implementation. The government’s acceptance of these recommendations marks a promising starting point for further progress.
A significant portion of the country report on Kosovo focuses on relations with Serbia and internal instability in northern Kosovo, notably highlighting the 2023 Banjska attack—an issue the EU has largely avoided addressing despite Kosovo’s repeated calls for action. Although the EU praised Kosovo’s investigation report, it has not taken concrete follow-up steps. The EU has pledged to monitor Kosovo’s constructive engagement in the Brussels Dialogue closely, setting clear expectations for the government to establish the Association of Serbian-Majority Municipalities, a major sticking point in Kosovo–EU relations.
The EU has also applied a “both-sides” approach to implementing the 2023 Brussels Agreement and the Ohrid Framework despite these agreements not being signed by either party. This stance persists even as the EU has yet to clarify whether the letter from the Serbian Prime Minister refusing to implement several critical articles of these unsigned agreements has been withdrawn. The new EU leadership might pave the way to unblock the process, setting it on a better course in search of a big breakthrough.
Lastly and most importantly, amidst the challenges highlighted in the report and current reality, Kosovo has shown commitment by actively engaging in the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, even under EU measures. The EU’s approval of Kosovo’s Reform Agenda also provides a glimmer of hope—a path through which Kosovo can progress on the EU agenda and strive for inclusion in the staged accession plan despite political obstacles from non-recognizing member states.