On 30 August, the Kosovo Police closed several parallel Serb institutions in north Kosovo, including parallel municipalities of Mitrovica, Zvečan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić. In addition to the municipalities, there are still enterprises, kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, and public universities directly funded by the Serbian government, located in towns and villages with a Serbian population.
According to Kosovo’s laws, these institutions are illegal. However, in 2013 Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement during the Brussels dialogue on the normalisations of relations to create an Association of Serb majority municipalities which would serve as a framework for Serb autonomy in Kosovo and formal relations to Serbia. Nevertheless, the agreement has yet to be implemented.
The latest actions by the Kosovo government prompted harsh reactions from the international community. According to the Western countries, Kosovo’s actions were carried out without consultations and risk increasing tensions, particularly affecting the most vulnerable communities.
This move comes at a time when the Kosovo government is already facing criticism from the international community for its unilateral and uncoordinated actions, which have been going on for months. One of these actions is also a decision by the Central Bank of Kosovo to ban the use of the Serbian dinar for payments. Since February, the euro has been the only currency allowed for use in the country.
Additionally, during the summer, Kosovo’s Government carried out various actions aimed at opening the bridge over the Ibar river in Mitrovica, despite Western countries and NATO being against it.
Aleksandar Šljuka from New Social Initiative (NSI), Mitrovica-based civil society organisation, assess that, given the significance of institutions for their users and the fact that there are no valid, or even, any alternatives within the Kosovo system, this should be done through the establishment of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, a mechanism that would ensure a “smooth” transition of non-integrated institutions.
“However, since this mechanism was never implemented in practice, the recent actions of the Government of Kosovo should be rightly characterised as unilateral, a view that has also been expressed in numerous statements by international actors involved in the dialogue process”, says Šljuka.
According to him, the essence of the problem lies in the fact that by “abolishing” these institutions in this manner, Serbian citizens in Kosovo, primarily those from the Serbian community, have been deprived of essential services, both financial and administrative, without providing alternatives within the Kosovo system.
“I wouldn’t go so far as to say that the community’s survival has been called into question by these actions, but they have certainly made life more difficult for the citizens who will now have to travel to central Serbia for almost every financial and administrative obligation, which represents an additional cost in terms of money, time, and energy”, says Šljuka.
He adds that if the practice of unilateral abolishment continues, particularly if the next targets are educational and healthcare institutions, this could indeed have far-reaching consequences for the survival of the Serbian community in Kosovo.
Actions contributed tensions, security situation is fragile
Ramadan Ilazi, Head of Research at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, says that actions by Kosovo Government have contributed heightened tensions with the local Serbian population and the international community.
“The security situation in the north of Kosovo remains tense and fragile, especially after the Banjska incident in September 2023, which has heightened concerns of further violence and instability. The latest actions have not been coordinated with international partners, which has worsened relations with key actors such as the US, EU, and even NATO”, adds Ilazi.
According to him, while the government views these measures as necessary for upholding the rule of law and countering criminal elements in the north of Kosovo, the heavy-handed approach has led to accusations of exacerbating tensions and undermining stability.
Visar Xhambazi, Project Manager at Sbunker, takes a similar stand, adding that recent actions by the Kosovo authorities have significantly heightened tensions with the Serb community, leaving them feeling marginalised and disempowered.
“The Kosovo Government has introduced new measures on an almost monthly basis – last month it was the attempt to open the Ibar bridge, this month a police operation raided the parallel offices. These initiatives have been implemented without consultation with the Serb community. Moreover, the Serb community’s collective withdrawal from Kosovo’s public institutions has further complicated the situation, making it increasingly fragile and heightening the risk of escalating tensions in the coming weeks”, recalls Xhambazi.
Kosovo Government simulates dialogue with the Serbian community
Although Prime Minister Kurti announced the beginning of the so-called “internal dialogue” with representatives of the Serbian community a long time ago, it has never actually started in practice.
At least 20 civil society organisations representing Serbs were not invited to the meeting where Kosovo Kurti met with NGOs representing Serbs and Bosniaks. Fifteen of these organisations have stated that the “so-called consultation process by the Kosovo government is being misused to legitimise a policy of unilateral actions that jeopardise the vital interests of the community”.
Aleksandar Šljuka assesses that he does not see a genuine willingness on the part of the authorities in Pristina to engage in dialogue with the Serbian community, adding that the government is stimulating the dialogue.
“We see that the Government of Kosovo is attempting to “simulate” it by organising meetings with selected representatives of the local community or civil society, with these meetings always being closed to the public”, says Aleksandar Šljuka.
According to him, the mere fact that during numerous actions taken by the current Government targeting the Serbian community, the members of that community were not consulted, despite these actions almost always having a negative impact on their lives, speaks volumes about the government’s willingness to engage in dialogue and its concerns for Kosovo’s Serbs.
“Our calls for organising public meetings or media-covered debates have never been answered”, he adds.
Actions in the north boost domestic support for the ruling party ahead of elections
In February 2025, parliamentary elections will be held in Kosovo, and some segments of the public view Prime Minister Kurti’s actions as part of his election campaign.
Visar Xhambazi assesses that the Kosovo government, led by Prime Minister Albin Kurti, has struggled to deliver on key policy promises.
“Achievements are notably absent, with little progress in educational and health reforms, major infrastructure projects, or social policies that could improve the lives of citizens. On the international stage, government has not secured membership in any international organizations or gained new state recognitions, despite being the longest-serving administration since 2008”, says Xhambazi.
He adds that the lack of tangible public policy successes has seemingly led the government to focus heavily on the north of Kosovo, possibly as a strategic move to bolster their reelection prospects.
Ramadan Ilazi agrees that it is plausible that some of these actions could be seen as part of the ruling party’s efforts to maintain or boost domestic political support.
“By taking a firm stance on issues of sovereignty and law enforcement in the north, the Kosovo government may be appealing to nationalist sentiments among its electorate, positioning itself as the protector of Kosovo’s territorial integrity”, he says.
He believes that this could serve as a strategy to rally political support ahead of upcoming elections in February of 2025, particularly in a political environment where issues of security and relations with Serbia have become key concerns for Kosovo Albanians.
Mild reactions from Belgrade
Although the situation in the north of Kosovo has in the past provoked strong rhetoric from official Belgrade, this is not the case this time. In some previous situations, Belgrade reacted much more vigorously, signalling support for specific actions on the ground, such as barricades or more active protests.
While the Kosovo Police are closing Serbian institutions in the north, the President of Serbia is visiting Western Serbia, where he is engaging with citizens about the Jadar lithium mine project. His activities in Western Serbia are the main news for pro-government media, while the situation in the north receives minimal attention.
During his visit to Kosovo last Friday, the European Union Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Miroslav Lajčák said to the journalists that the letter sent last December by Serbia on “red lines” for the implementation of the 2023 Ohrid agreements had been withdrawn.
The letter was sent by Ana Brnabić, then Prime Minister of Serbia, on the occasion of the EU-Western Balkan Summit on 13 December 2023, days before the early parliamentary election in Serbia.
Lajčák says Serbia has withdrawn letter on Ohrid agreement “red lines”, no reaction from Belgrade
Aleksandar Šljuka assesss that it is evident that the authorities in Belgrade are tacitly supporting the changes on the ground.
“There are two possible reasons for that. First, it suits them that the actual implementation of the agreement, i.e., the “dismantling/forced” integration of institutions, is carried out by Pristina rather than Belgrade, with the aim of finally resolving the Kosovo issue. Second, they choose to remain passive in order to expose Kurti to additional criticism from international actors and potential sanctions, thereby garnering sympathy for alternative solutions in the dialogue”, says Šljuka.
According to him, the extremely mild reaction to the recent events is certainly surprising, given their symbolic as well as practical significance.
“Time will very soon reveal which strategy Belgrade has chosen, perhaps already if Kurti decides to proceed with shutting down educational and healthcare institutions”, Šljuka concludes.