Prime Minister of Serbia Miloš Vučević announced he would resign on 28 January 2025, amid the mass student protests. As of 20 February, the parliament has still not met to confirm his resignation, which will start the 30-day deadline for it to elect a new government. If that does not happen, President Aleksandar Vučić would have to call snap elections.
While the ruling party has often strategically resorted to snap elections in the past, most commentators believe that they are currently a less likely option and that they would not contribute to the resolution of the ongoing crisis.
The main arguments for this assessment are that the Serbian opposition is united in refusing a possible election, citing unfair election conditions, as well as the fact that the situation is still too volatile for Vučić’s liking. Students are unlikely to stop their protests even if elections are announced, since new elections, or even the resignation of the government, are not among their demands.
New elections might be an attractive option for the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) since it would still be a favourite to win them, owing to the loyal party base, but also the tilted playing field, which includes media dominance, command over country resources, unresolved issues with the voter registry and organizational weaknesses of the opposition. However, SNS has so far strongly hinted it is planning to elect a new government with the majority it still commands in the parliament.
This scenario corresponds to the prevailing opinion among the experts. Vujo Ilić, a research fellow at the University of Belgrade, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, assessed in an earlier analysis of the European Western Balkans that, while calling for new elections could allow the ruling party to leverage its advantage in resources, this move may be too risky for President Vučić, who prefers to call snap elections only when he has a clear upper hand.
The reason why Vučić might not feel comfortable enough at this point is the fact that almost a month since the Government’s resignation, the protests have not subsided and the atmosphere in the country is still very tense. In 2023, Vučić allowed the large protests that broke out following the mass shooting in May to die down before calling for a snap election.
Another important factor is the opposition’s pledge that it would boycott the election. SNS has already experienced one opposition boycott in 2020 when the ruling coalition won all but 6 seats in the 250-seat parliament. Due to the lack of legitimacy, Vučić announced snap elections for 2022 before the 2020 parliament even held its first session.
This logic is probably what is currently preventing SNS from holding an election without a guarantee that the opposition would run. Instead of restoring legitimacy which has been seriously called into question by the ongoing protests, the party might provoke an even deeper legitimacy crisis.
What are the problems with Serbian electoral conditions?
According to the conclusions of the international observers, the last parliamentary elections, held in 2023, though technically well-administered, were dominated by the decisive media involvement of the President which together with the ruling party’s systemic advantages created unjust conditions.
Fundamental freedoms were generally respected in the campaign, but it was marred by harsh rhetoric, bias in the media, pressure on public sector employees and misuse of public resources, observers assessed.
When it comes to the Unified Voting Register, “allegations that numerous persons deceased, including abroad, remained in the register, along with claims of voter migration in connection with local elections, diminished trust in its accuracy”, observers assessed.
The claims of organized voter migration marked the December 2023 elections as the most controversial issue, eroding the trust in the voter registry among a significant number of citizens. This led to a partial boycott of the June 2024 local elections.
Almost nothing has been done since to improve electoral conditions and increase the trust among those who had lost it over the previous decade of elections dominated by SNS. A working group to implement the recommendations of international observers was established in the parliament in April 2024, which initially received praise from the EU.
However, after ten months of work, the group has not yet agreed on a single legislative change, and part of the civil society and opposition have withdrawn from it, citing lack of constructiveness of the ruling majority.