BELGRADE – The European Union has taken markedly different approaches to the political crises in Serbia and Georgia, despite growing public discontent and mounting state pressure in both countries. An analysis by the Centre for Contemporary Politics (CSP), published in cooperation with the Jacques Delors Institute, examines this discrepancy, arguing that Brussels has adopted a considerably tougher stance towards Tbilisi while exercising diplomatic restraint in its dealings with Belgrade.
The analysis was published in Summer 2026, prior to the electoral defeat of the regime of Aleksandar Vučić on 25 October snap parliamentary elections by the Student List.
The contrast is particularly apparent in the EU’s response to developments in the two countries. In Georgia, the adoption of a Russian-style foreign agents law, disputed parliamentary elections and the government’s unilateral decision to suspend EU integration prompted financial cuts, visa restrictions and increasingly critical statements from Brussels. Serbia, by comparison, faced no comparable measures despite sustained mass protests and repeated reports of excessive police force throughout 2024 and 2025. The EU’s response remained largely confined to critical parliamentary resolutions and more pointed assessments in its annual progress reports.
CSP identified several factors behind this disparity, including Serbia’s longer-standing accession process, its strategic importance to stability in the Western Balkans and the EU’s assessment that the immediate scale of repression was less severe than in Georgia.
Yet neither approach appears to have delivered the intended results. In Georgia, the EU’s more confrontational policy has done little to change the government’s authoritarian trajectory, partly because member states have failed to reach consensus on targeted sanctions. In Serbia, the absence of meaningful political or economic pressure has instead contributed to growing disillusionment among pro-European citizens, reinforcing the perception that Brussels is willing to overlook democratic backsliding for the sake of maintaining relations with the authorities.
Rethinking the EU’s approach to candidate countries
Against this backdrop, the study calls for a reassessment of how the EU responds to political crises in candidate countries. Rather than relying on approaches shaped by individual geopolitical considerations, CSP argued that Brussels needs a more consistent framework that combines sustained political engagement with measures capable of producing tangible consequences.
One of the study’s central arguments concerns the EU’s economic leverage, which remains substantially greater in Serbia than in Georgia. Approximately 60% of Serbia’s total trade is conducted with the EU, compared with around 20% in Georgia. Serbia also receives considerably higher levels of European foreign direct investment, exceeding Georgian levels by more than €400 million annually, as well as significantly greater pre-accession financial assistance. These differences raise questions about the EU’s reluctance to use the instruments at its disposal in Serbia.
The EU’s response to democratic backsliding is also a test of its own credibility. When similar political developments elicit markedly different reactions, Brussels risks undermining the very democratic standards it seeks to promote. A more credible approach would require moving beyond case-by-case diplomatic calculations towards sustained engagement, a more consistent use of political and economic leverage, and closer cooperation with the domestic actors working to defend democratic institutions.
The analysis was published within the project Think Tanks for the Future of EU Enlargement (TFEP), supported by the Open Society Institute – Sofia.
