The article was originally published on the BiEPAG blog.
The Commission’s 2026 report on North Macedonia documents another year of modest reform. Only three of the 33 chapters made good progress: digital transformation and media (10), science and research (25), and foreign, security and defense policy (31). Most importantly, there was no progress on corruption. Persistent interference undermines judicial independence, while high-level corruption cases face delays and often reach the statute of limitations.
Modest progress over the past year should not obscure the preparedness the country has built as the Western Balkans’ longest-standing candidate. A comparison of the Commission’s assessments across 33 chapters shows it on par with Serbia, both trailing Montenegro and Albania. Yet it has still not fully opened accession negotiations. Bilateral disputes explain the mismatch between preparedness and formal progress. The gap is narrowing as North Macedonia’s relative advantage erodes: Albania has moved ahead, and Moldova is catching up. This dwindling advantage exposes the costs of embedding bilateral demands in the accession process.
Responsibility starts in Skopje. The accession blockage cannot excuse failures to tackle corruption or protect judicial independence. These reforms serve citizens directly and can advance even as negotiations remain stalled. The structural problem is equally real. Bilateral demands have become part of European conditionality, yet their interpretation and fulfillment remain ambiguous and vulnerable to disputes between neighbors. This weakens confidence that meeting agreed conditions will lead to the next step. The Prespa Agreement and subsequent blockages help explain why another difficult compromise is a harder political proposition today. Constitutional amendments are required to complete the opening of negotiations, while disagreement over the minority action plan already clouds the step beyond.
The Growth Plan offers a revealing comparison. When conditions and benefits are clear, North Macedonia delivers. The Commission identifies it among the top performers under the Reform and Growth Facility. Conditionality remains a powerful driver of reform when clear requirements are tied to predictable, tangible benefits.
The minority action plan illustrates the institutional problem. It is an EU requirement, incorporated at Sofia’s insistence into the opening benchmarks for the Fundamentals cluster. The report acknowledges progress in preparing it through inclusive consultations involving minority and community representatives, with Council of Europe expertise. However, its content is now being discussed bilaterally with Bulgaria due to its objections.
Sofia is an interested party with a veto; treating it as the sole judge of compliance also undermines the European character of the requirement. Minority rights deserve rigorous scrutiny against European standards. Calls for dialogue are insufficient. The Commission should take responsibility for that assessment, drawing on independent expertise and involving the Union collectively. Bulgaria’s concerns belong within that assessment. Bilateral dialogue can support this process but cannot substitute for European responsibility.
Complaints, however justified, are not a strategy. For Skopje, the task is to build support to overcome the constitutional obstacle while accelerating reforms and designing credible safeguards against open-ended bilateral demands. Such safeguards should preserve its leverage and ensure that meeting preconditions is not in vain. Sofia could facilitate the process if it defines its endgame for North Macedonia as a stable, friendly neighbor and a future partner within the EU, building a relationship that outlasts the veto.
Amid Russia’s war against Ukraine, an intensifying geopolitical rivalry, and a fraying international order, Europe must think big again. Completing the integration of the Western Balkans, a region surrounded by EU member states, is part of securing Europe’s future. Shying away from the region’s difficult cases, including problems that the Union’s own decision-making practices have helped entrench, is a luxury Europe can no longer afford.
