Last Friday, the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union announced that five out of six Reform Agendas of the Western Balkan countries had been adopted. Meanwhile, this Monday in Berlin, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that the Reform Agendas would be adopted later this week. These documents, prepared by the candidate countries, are necessary for access to funding from the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans.
So, have the Reform Agendas already been adopted or not? It seems uncertain, making them, in a sense, akin to Schrödinger’s cat. Only when the box is opened, that is when the money starts flowing, will we know for sure.
This situation, actually, seems to be another case of misunderstanding (or misrepresenting) of the EU decision-making. The Regulation setting up the Growth Plan stipulates that “the Commission shall approve by means of an implementing decision the Reform Agenda submitted by the beneficiary” following the examination of Member States. This seemingly supports von der Leyen’s position, meaning that the Hungarian Presidency prematurely announced the conclusion of the process, which was reported as such in multiple regional media outlets.
This analysis might as well be regarded as a nitpick, given the fact that, politically, the Reform Agendas are a done deal and that we are probably only looking at several days of difference. It is, however, also a case of the Hungarian Presidency taking credit for something that is not, strictly speaking, under the authority of the Council.
One of the ways how Hungary has used its presidency has been to increase its soft power in the Western Balkans, putting enlargement among the priorities. In theory, of course, this is perfectly legitimate. The problem for many pro-EU citizens in the region is that Hungary’s way of promoting enlargement usually legitimizes and entrenches the region’s illiberal leaders.
Nevertheless, as the past five years have shown, the influence of individual countries on the enlargement policy is limited. Hungary’s Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi was indeed accused of tweaking the Commission’s reports for the benefit of Prime Minister Orbán’s allies, and he has studiously avoided making any critical statements about their (un)democratic track record. But nothing has fundamentally changed in the enlargement process from 2019 to 2022, showing that the key factor in this area remains the consensus (or lack thereof) among the EU member states.
This consensus was modified in 2022, and Prime Minister of Albania Edi Rama was right yesterday when he thanked Vladimir Putin for opening the first Cluster with the EU. For us following the process for a while, the memories of the time when almost nothing was progressing are still vivid. Now, the war in Ukraine has made the EU member states reach a consensus that they will have to, at least, get some things moving again.
Ukraine and Moldova have been the primary beneficiaries of the new dynamism, while in the Western Balkans the progress has been uneven, with Montenegro visibly accelerating its pace. Some years ago, when I was studying political science, a part of the lecture on EU enlargement was how the Union decided to modify the process based on the flaws of previous rounds by introducing “interim benchmarks” for the rule of law chapters. With the strong enlargement fatigue at the time, this innovation seemed rather theoretical. This year, when Montenegro received the IBAR report, we were finally able to see this applied in practice. I also don’t remember the Belgian Council presidency taking credit for it as overtly as Hungary does.
It is still quite difficult to see how far this new dynamic will take the candidate countries. Many citizens in the region are justifiably sceptical that it will take them all the way to full EU membership. We will get clearer answers during the two upcoming events which might signal that the EU is seriously preparing for new members – next year’s policy reviews of the Commission and the negotiations of the new Multi-Annual Financial Framework 2028-2034.