In a region marked by clear geopolitical alignments, Serbia stands out for its ongoing quest to remain diplomatically agile—balancing between the EU, the US, Russia, China, and Turkey Unlike other Western Balkan states, Serbia has undergone a slow but consistent drift away from the EU’s foreign and security policy. This reached a historical low in 2024, with Serbia aligning with only 47% of the EU’s foreign policy declarations—down from 66% in 2015.
During the same period, the influence of other geopolitical actors, particularly the PRC, has expanded significantly. High-level meetings between Serbian and Chinese presidents occur almost annually, including through the Central and Eastern Europe–China Summit mechanism. Interestingly, despite strong public sentiment in favour of Russia, Serbia has largely severed official communication with the Russian Federation since the onset of the war in Ukraine.
There have been no high-level meetings in the past three years, compared with nine between 2019 and 2021. This is also reflected in the defence sector: since 2021, there have been no bilateral military exercises with Russia, whereas from 2017 to 2021, Serbia participated in no fewer than 12 bilateral and seven joint exercises (with Belarus and Collective Security Treaty Organization – CSTO partners).
Economically, Serbia remains largely dependent on the EU and, to a lesser extent, the US. No fewer than seven EU business chambers and the American Chamber of Commerce are active in the country. Between 2007 and 2022, Serbia received development aid from the US ranging from USD 19.98 million to USD 105.12 million. The EU, as Serbia’s largest donor, provided between USD 172 million and USD 1.045 billion in the same period.
Nevertheless, public perception often overstates the contributions of PRC, Russia, and Turkey, despite their significantly lower levels of financial assistance (for exact numbers see Interdependence Database, Serbia section, available from May 26). Serbia’s “four pillars” foreign policy doctrine promotes balanced cooperation with all geopolitical actors. This approach has enabled Serbia to establish free trade agreements with all of them—most notably leveraged by Chinese companies to access the European market.
Additionally, Serbia maintains visa-free regimes with all of these countries (excluding the US), a policy that proved critical following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As the only European country without a visa regime for Russian citizens, Serbia experienced a significant influx of Russians fleeing the war. It is estimated that between 80,000 and 110,000 Russian nationals currently reside in Serbia.
Soft power dynamics are also clearly visible. The American Corner network has a presence in almost every major Serbian city, while most EU cultural institutions—such as the Institut Français, Goethe-Institut, Instituto Cervantes, and the Italian Institute for Culture—have operated in Belgrade for decades.
However, the soft power landscape is increasingly contested. China has recently opened two Confucius Institutes in Belgrade and Novi Sad, while Turkey has been founding Maarif schools across south of Serbia where there is a large Muslim population. The Russian House in Belgrade, operating for over 90 years, also continues to exert cultural (and political) influence.
All major powers are competing to win the “hearts and minds” of young Serbians through state-sponsored scholarships and education programmes. Although PRC, Russian Federation, and Turkey collaborate with Serbian ministries to fund student mobility and academic exchanges, their initiatives are dwarfed by EU-funded schemes such as Erasmus+, bilateral state agreements with the EU countries, and US-sponsored scholarships, including Fulbright and American Councils programmes (up to 2025).
Serbia’s continued struggle against Kosovo’s independence has contributed to its political and, to a degree, security disengagement from the EU and the US. Yet, the country remains economically tethered to these two actors, with whom it also shares profound historical and cultural ties. Whether Serbia will continue its balancing act or pivot decisively in one direction remains an open question.
This blog post includes insights derived from the database developed as part of the GEO-POWER-EU project. The project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 10113292. The content of this post does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission. The EC is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained herein.