President Aleksandar Vučić’s recent speech on Kosovo is not only irrational but intentionally designed to further the heightened ethnic tensions in Kosovo. While the legitimate concerns of Kosovo’s Serbian community should be acknowledged, Vučić’s remarks did little to address them constructively.
Instead, his speech promoted some positions that would only worsen the situation, such as the idea to establish a special Prosecutor’s Office for prosecuting alleged abuses committed in the north by the public officials of Kosovo.
It is clear to everyone that the current status quo in the north of Kosovo is unsustainable. Civil society organizations in Kosovo have repeatedly warned that without a sustainable solution, it would lead to violence, which materialized in the Banjska attack of September 2023. What is urgently needed is a clear path that the Kosovo government should present, toward restoration of normality and stability in the north of Kosovo. A critical part of this process should be the establishment of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM), a mechanism for giving Kosovo Serbs a greater say in their own affairs.
However, from Vučić’s speech, it is evident he has no interest in fostering such integration. Instead, his preference appears to be for continued instability in the north of Kosovo, exploiting the unpredictability of the current situation.
What is particularly concerning over Vučić’s speech is that his underlying message, seems to be, that Kosovo Serbs can only be safe in an environment of ethnic dominance, not one of pluralism. This narrative does nothing to help Kosovo Serbs and is instead aimed at sustaining tension. While Vučić’s desire for autocratic practices are well-known, the recent escalation of his rhetoric and posturing, helped in part by the confrontational path taken by Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti, has veered into dangerous territory.
In assessing President Vučić’s approach to the Kosovo issue, it’s important to consider not just his recent speech, but also the broader context of his actions. In November 2022, it is safe to say that Belgrade was behind the mass resignation of Kosovo Serbs from local institutions in the north, including police and municipal bodies. It is highly unlikely that such an action would have been taken by the local Kosovo Serb leaders in the north, without consultation and coordination with Belgrade. This was also evident in the failed recall petition to remove the Albanian mayors, with some senior officials in the Serbian government celebrating the failure, somehow promoting it as a victory.
Yet now, two years later, Vučić calls for new elections in the north and for Serbs to return to the very institutions he encouraged them to abandon. His demands for elections and the restoration of services suggest he understands that this strategy was not only a mistake but has backfired.
However, this indirect acknowledgment by President Vučić of the wrong strategy, is not accompanied by a genuine effort toward integration or peace; instead, it remains a tactical move to maintain some credibility or legitimacy towards the Kosovo Serb population and keep the area in a state of tension. The initial resignations left Kosovo Serbs without political representation and undermined their influence within Kosovo’s democratic processes. This realization, belated as it is, exposes the flaws in Belgrade’s approach and highlights how this move only further isolated the Serbian community in Kosovo.
The long-term solution to Kosovo’s challenges lies in fostering the values and principles of a civic state, which is what the Constitution of Kosovo promotes, where all ethnic groups feel represented and protected. Rather than undermining Kosovo’s institutions, Vučić should encourage Kosovo Serbs to participate fully in them.
This also requires a proactive and affirmative approach from Kosovo’s leaders, who should prioritize policies that foster trust in state institutions, rather than on actions that antagonize the Kosovo Serbs in the north and make their everyday life difficult. Of particular relevance, is for the Kosovo government to urgently think of a set of confidence building measures for the north of Kosovo and an immediate change of the discourse/language related to the north.
Vučić’s Rhetoric: A Return to Ethnonationalism
Vučić’s speech was also marked by incendiary rhetoric, laced with disturbing undertones reminiscent of Serbia’s nationalist past. His comparison of Kosovo Albanian leaders to Adolf Hitler is not only inflammatory but calculated to deepen the ethnic divide. This type of language is not merely offensive; it echoes dangerous ethnonationalist narratives from the past, where Kosovo Albanians were dehumanized and targeted for violence.
What makes these remarks especially dangerous is that Vučić was part of the Milošević regime, the very government responsible for widespread atrocities during the Kosovo war. His portrayal of Kosovo Albanians as aggressors and Serbs as perpetual victims reinforces a siege mentality that undermines any possibility of dialogue and reconciliation. This also helps reinforce some attitudes that reject any effort of normalization of the situation in the north and seek to create conditions that would be ripe for separation of the north.
Kosovo should not be viewed as a battleground for ethnic dominance, but as a multiethnic society where cooperation and integration are the only paths to long-term peace and stability. This is something both the Kosovo government and the Serbian leadership must embrace if the region is to move forward.
Vučić’s Real Agenda: Nationalism as a Distraction
During his speech, Vučić called for the creation of a Serbian special prosecutor’s office tasked with investigating and prosecuting alleged crimes committed by Kosovo officials against Serbs in the north of Kosovo. While framed as a mechanism for justice, this proposal is nothing more than a tool for political manipulation. This move, if actually materialized, would likely inflame further tensions in Kosovo by positioning Serbia as a unilateral judge of Kosovo’s internal matters, undermining both the sovereignty of Kosovo and the EU-facilitated normalization dialogue process.
This proposal is not aimed at addressing the legitimate concerns of Kosovo Serbs; it is designed to perpetuate grievance narratives and keep Kosovo Serbs in limbo. Such a step would not advance peace or security—it would lead to further polarization and prevent meaningful engagement between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo’s institutions.
It is no secret that Vučić uses the Kosovo issue to rally nationalist sentiment and distract from Serbia’s pressing domestic challenges. The continued focus on Kosovo provides a convenient scapegoat for the country’s struggles, especially corruption, and democratic backsliding. By framing Kosovo as Serbia’s “most painful and difficult point,” Vučić creates a narrative that allows him to sidestep accountability for his government’s failures and deflect attention from Serbia’s internal issues.
This nationalist fervor, however, is unsustainable. It locks Serbia in a perpetual state of conflict, both internally and externally. While Vučić may find it politically expedient to keep the Kosovo issue alive, this strategy will ultimately fail.
Over time, even the appeasement from the West, which has allowed Vučić to continue this approach, will diminish. When coupled with irrationality of Kosovo’s Prime Minister Kurti, Vučić’s obsession with Kosovo as a tool for political survival will lead the entire region into deeper stagnation.