Originally published on BiEPAG blog
It was no ordinary Wednesday! The publishing of European Commission’s (EC) annual report on Serbia’s success on its European integration path in the previous period was eagerly awaited. EU nerds, journalists, friends and family, all were keen to get the first glimpse of the EC report. Getting an early copy of the draft report was a matter of particular prestige among peers.
To avoid confusion, this short introduction refers to Wednesday, October 8 2014, the year when Serbia started its EU accession talks. Since then, the hype, anticipation and interest regarding EC’s take on Serbia’s EU accession process is long gone.
This year’s report has slightly changed its format in order to provide more transparent, succinct and concrete information to citizens who might wish to learn more about their countries’ EU accession path. At first glance, the report is well balanced and genuinely describes the mixed bag that is the implementation of formal requirements and the absence of substantial progress. There are no major surprises, negative or positive, and ‘business as usual’ might be the best way to describe Serbia’s current EU accession perspective.
EC has once again recommended opening negotiations on Cluster 3 since Serbia has fulfilled the opening benchmarks, but member states are yet to reach consensus and decide on the matter. The three major areas which will continue to define the dynamics of Serbia’s EU accession negotiations remain unchanged – reforms in the area of rule of law, normalisation of relations with Kosovo and alignment with EU’s foreign policy in particular concerning sanctions against Russia after its aggression on Ukraine “as a matter of priority”.
When it comes to the key takeaways, the report noted that a high level of relations with Russia and China continues to raise questions about Serbia’s strategic orientation; once again Serbia is invited to improve electoral conditions and respect recommendations from ODIHR/OSCE “as a matter of priority” (unfortunately, part of the EU’s credibility was irreversibly damaged by its unwillingness to react more decisively after the last elections in Serbia); EC notes the difficult environment in which civil society organizations and journalists operate, which directly effects the freedom of expression (lack of it) – no progress was made in addressing last year’s recommendations in this area.
Additionally, it is worth noting that this year the EC managed to provide an assessment of democratic institutions’ functioning which is an integral part of the fundamentals’ cluster and on that scale, Serbia found itself positioned behind Montenegro, Moldova, North Macedonia and Albania.
Statistically speaking, Serbia has made minimal progress regarding its readiness for EU membership. The average grade of 3.11 is better by 0.06 points compared to last year. Can citizens feel the improvement of their lives by 0.06 points? Do they feel 0.06 closer to the EU? I wouldn’t bet on it. With regard to the progress achieved compared to last year’s report, there was none recorded in nine negotiation chapters and the area of public administration reform, while in four chapters, a half-point progress was noted (chapters 16, 18, 21, 24).
At this pace of harmonization with EU regulations and standards, it will take decades for Serbia to fulfil the membership requirements, and the Government has just set itself an ambitious task to complete this process by the end of 2027 (which is a 9-year delay compared to the original plan presented in the opening statement of the Republic of Serbia at the start of accession negotiations). The reasons for such a weak performance are various and it is certainly possible to find an alibi in the fact that until 2022 the process of EU enlargement stood still (although, no one prevented the Serbian authorities from independently implementing the necessary reforms for the benefit of their own citizens). However, since the Russian aggression against Ukraine, a new momentum has been apparent.
The EU is starting to prepare for absorption of new members, considering how its expansion will affect its core values, its policies, budget and management structure. In such circumstances, it is necessary for Serbian authorities to start fulfilling their obligations with much more ambition and honesty. The obligations have been known for a long time, but there lacks sincere political will and dedication to reforms, as we have been stating for years by writing similar reactions.
What is particularly interesting about this year’s report is that its publishing coincides with the conclusion of the mandate of the old Commission and immediately after the visit of its new/old President to the region. The public in Serbia was particularly interested in the disproportionality between positive evaluations expressed during her visit and the substance of the report written by the EC President’s administration. Unfortunately, the contrast is obvious, and the assessment that Serbian authorities fulfil their obligations does not find its confirmation in the report. The question arises as to why EC representatives are continuing to send ambiguous messages at a time when they are demanding from Serbia a more sincere attitude towards fulfilling obligations and clear communication regarding the positive effects of accession to the Union. It seems that concerns of the geopolitical reality taking precedence over the respect of principles of democracy were not unfounded and that a transactional relationship between the authoritarian regime and the EU continues to be based on pragmatism and opportunism, rather than the respect of democratic values.
Finally, this year’s report is the last one presented by the controversial Commissioner for Enlargement, who in previous years “in the spirit of good neighbourly relations” was too tolerant when it comes to the autocratic tendencies of the Serbian authorities and thus contributed to diminishing the integrity of the Union’s enlargement process. Every time he leniently brushed off serious issues that had direct consequences for democracy and the rights of Serbian citizens, the EU would lose a percentage of support among the Serbian public.
If enlargement is a strategic interest of the EU, its attitude towards a regime that continuously violates the basic principles of parliamentary democracy must change for the benefit of both sides in the negotiations, i.e. EU and the citizens of Serbia (not exclusively the interest of the regime), and the future Commissioner for Enlargement will have to do that job with much more integrity, determination and sincerity. Because honesty is the basis of mutual trust, and trust is the key to the return of credibility of the enlargement process and Serbia’s accession to the EU.