On Tuesday, members of the European Parliament will debate the ongoing political crisis in Serbia. Exactly two weeks will have passed since Serbian Prime Minister Miloš Vučević resigned in an attempt to defuse mass protests following the deadly collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy in November 2024. The tragedy, which claimed 15 lives, ignited nationwide demonstrations—the largest since those that led to the fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000—with protesters demanding accountability and the rule of law.
Marta Kos, the EU commissioner for enlargement, is expected to join the debate in Strasbourg. Parliamentarians who have closely followed developments in Serbia initially hoped for stronger engagement from her. However, many now fear that on Tuesday, she will merely echo the talking points from her open letter last week, addressed to Serbian academia, political representatives, and civil society organisations.
A letter that fell flat
In her 20-sentence letter, Commissioner Kos acknowledged some concerns about developments in Serbia but remained cautiously neutral. She reiterated core EU values—the rule of law, freedom of assembly, and EU accession-related reforms—without signalling any new initiatives or concrete actions. Its formal tone and lack of urgency left many unconvinced and others even angered, reinforcing the impression that Brussels sees the ongoing protests and their political consequences more as a burden than an opportunity to advance EU policy.
When Marta Kos assumed her role on 1 December 2024, European Commission officials responsible for Serbia believed that EU policy was finally gaining momentum and heading in the right direction. After three years of total stalemate, EU member states seemed, for the first time, to be seriously considering responding positively to the Commission’s recommendation to advance Serbia’s accession talks.
Even as protests were already underway in early December, Gert Jan Koopman, the Commission’s highest-ranking official responsible for enlargement, argued passionately that in terms of technical criteria, “Serbia has been ready for a long time” to open new negotiating chapters. He also asserted that on fundamental criteria, including the rule of law and the fight against corruption, “Serbia has moved forward.”
The eagerness to advance Serbia’s accession process was also linked to Belgrade’s engagement in the European Commission’s new flagship initiative—the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. By early October 2024, after months of sometimes difficult negotiations, Serbia had adopted a 150-page reform agenda covering socio-economic and rule of law reforms, with clear implementation deadlines extending until December 2027. If expectations are met, Serbia could access €1.6 billion in grants and loans, along with benefiting from selected areas of the EU’s single market.
All of this stood in stark contrast to the assessments of those taking to the streets in Serbia. Not only due to violent incidents targeting demonstrators or because of the misuse of personal documents, which were obtained and published by pro-government media.
The EU’s waning influence in Serbia
But for the first time since 2018, European Commission officials felt their access to Serbian authorities and their ability to exert influence might finally improve. That year, EU member states had rejected the Commission’s proposal to set 2025 as a target date for Serbia’s EU membership. Since then, the EU’s once-dominant political position in Serbia has been steadily eroding. It has gradually been squeezed out by a multi-vector foreign policy that increasingly sidelined the EU while deepening reliance on China, as well as the US, Russia and other actors.
The Commission initially remained mostly silent, de facto ignoring the protests and expecting their fading, as had been the case with several larger protests in recent years.
However, over the past two months—under pressure from the European Parliament and international media—this approach has become increasingly difficult to maintain. Despite what some in Brussels might still believe, the protests and their political consequences have altered the political landscape. The prime minister’s resignation and the possibility of new parliamentary elections signal a turning point. Key civil society organisations have cut all cooperation with the government, including withdrawing from the electoral law reform process. Given these developments, the Commission has little reason to believe it can still push forward its plan to advance Serbia’s accession process or see reforms implemented on schedule.
In reality, the hope of slowing down the collapse of the EU’s once-dominant position in Serbia and regaining influence—based on the EU’s current offer—was always little more than wishful thinking. Without a clear timeline for full membership and reforms directly linked to accession—or a meaningful interim step, such as full integration into the EU’s single market—Serbia has no reason to see the EU as anything more than one of several major players in its backyard. With Donald Trump back in the White House, Belgrade may instead focus on leveraging its close ties to expand its territory into four northern Kosovo municipalities and support secessionist ambitions among Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
A Speech That Must Matter
If Commissioner Kos steps into the Hemicycle on Tuesday, her trip to Strasbourg will only be worthwhile if her speech marks the beginning of a real shift in the European Commission’s approach to Serbia. Choosing Montenegro for her first visit to the region since her appointment—rather than following her predecessors’ tradition of visiting Serbia—was a welcome gesture. To be meaningful, this shift must now include acknowledging the ongoing protests, their motivations, their scale, and the political consequences that have already materialised.
In doing so, the Commissioner should, without hesitation, highlight the findings of the European Commission’s latest report. Published only two days before the Novi Sad tragedy, the report warned that “undue pressure on the judiciary remains a concern.” It criticised the current system of recruitment and promotion of judges and prosecutors for not “ensuring that careers are fully based on merit.” It also noted “violent incidents and a number of arrests” following the December 2023 elections, along with reports of “allegations of police brutality, including against journalists.” These very issues have driven students and others to protest in Serbia. These very concerns have kept them on the streets for so long.
If Serbia is to hold early parliamentary elections, the Commission must take seriously its own report’s conclusion that “the conduct of [future] elections requires tangible improvement and further reform.” This includes concerns about “widespread pressure on public sector employees, misuse of public resources, and media bias in favour of the ruling coalition.”
The Commissioner could announce her intention to travel to Belgrade to meet both protesters and civil society organisations. She could propose designing and supporting an inclusive dialogue to pave the way for new parliamentary elections in an improved electoral and media environment. Furthermore, the Commission could offer to send experts to monitor police and judicial processes related to the Novi Sad tragedy and attacks on protesters.
For this shift to be consequential, however, Commissioner Kos will need to convince EU member states to support her by reviving the enlargement process. If delivered effectively, her speech on Tuesday could be the first significant step in that direction.