In recent years, the political landscape of the EU has been undergoing a significant transformation due to the rising influence of far-right and Eurosceptic parties across several member states, including France, Germany, Italy, Spain and others. The 2024 European Parliament elections reinforced this trend, as radical right-wing and Eurosceptic parties made substantial gains, shifting the balance of power in EU institutions. A new study by the initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) shows that these forces are likely to have an impact also on enlargement policy.
The so-called “cordon sanitaire”, defined as the refusal of mainstream parties to cooperate with political forces whose policies are deemed unacceptable or extremist – usually the ones situated at the far-right of the political spectrum, is gradually being dismantled. Over the past three years, far-right parties have successfully joined governmental coalitions in Western European countries like Italy and the Netherlands, while Victor Orban in Hungary has been joined at the European Council by like-minded Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico.
Surely, this surge in support for far-right parties is not new; several far-right parties made significant electoral gains in the previous decade, capitalising on series of crises, including the migration & refugee and the Eurozone ones. However, these parties have gradually departed from their purely reactionary anti-EU stance and now aim to proactively shape the agenda both at national but also more notably at EU level, shifting further the political pendulum to the right. They can achieve this in two ways: either by joining government coalitions, as seen with the Dutch PVV or by exerting indirect influence on mainstream parties, as seen with the Sweden Democrats, who since September 2022 support the centre-right government without formally being part of it. These shifts mirror Orbán’s longstanding approach.
Germany as the outlier – until when?
The above patterns point towards the increasing normalisation of these parties. Yet, one major exception to this broader trend has been the German far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) which has so far remained marginalised by the political establishment, largely due to the country’s historical particularities.
However, earlier this month, a longstanding political taboo of post war Germany was broken, after the leader of the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Friedrich Merz, introduced a series of tougher measures on migration by also relying on AfD’s votes in the Bundestag. Merz and senior party figures have repeatedly overruled any prospects of collaborating with the AfD. The likely next Chancellor Merz has framed his tougher stance on migration as a tactic aiming to stop AfD’s polling momentum. However, AfD’s reaction has been celebratory, with spokesperson Bernd Baumann calling the vote a “historic moment” and party leader Alice Weidel condemning mainstream parties for attempting to exclude their supporters.
What this means for EU enlargement and the Western Balkans
Even if the CDU continues to reject formal cooperation with the AfD, the pressure to toughen positions on key issues, like migration and climate, could reshape Germany’s EU policy priorities.
One area where this shift could be most consequential is EU enlargement, particularly for the Western Balkans but also Ukraine and Moldova: Although much focus has already been given on these parties’ stance on other areas, mainly migration and climate policies, their positions on enlargement remain underexplored despite their potential to reshape the process. Ultimately, the EU’s readiness for enlargement increasingly hinges on member states’ ability to reach a political consensus regarding the timing and conditions of enlargement. In other words, political will ultimately outweighs technical or legal criteria.
In addition, public support for enlargement in EU member states is another key factor. Certain national governments could potentially hold referenda to allow their citizens to decide on whether to accept new members, particularly if enlargement is to be combined with internal reforms and the further transferral of powers to Brussels. The latest Eurobarometer surveys suggest that public scepticism towards enlargement is particularly strong in Western European member states where radical right parties hold significant sway, including Germany, France and Austria.
Based on the findings of the study published within the framework of the initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, it is important to understand that a majority of radical right and far-right parties in Europe have expressed anti-enlargement or enlargement-sceptic views. The study revealed that these parties ground their views on issues sensitive to their own domestic agendas. Migration remains one of the most contentious issues shaping far-right positions on enlargement. Indicatively, parties like the Rassemblement National (RN) in France and the FPÖ in Austria have consistently linked enlargement to concerns about potential implications on migration, crime, and national security. Their rhetoric frequently focuses on candidate countries with large Muslim populations, implying that their admission could intensify migrant flows and jeopardise what their nativist agendas perceive as European cultural identity.
Economic factors also influence far-right opposition to enlargement. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has emerged as a crucial battleground, particularly in the context of Ukraine’s EU candidacy, and especially in terms of competition for EU subsidies and financial redistribution. Russian disinformation campaigns have fuelled fears that Ukraine’s membership would disrupt European agriculture, a claim echoed by several Eurosceptic parties in member states which are net contributors to the EU budget including Austria, France, and the Netherlands. The use of these arguments could easily be extended to Western Balkans as well, especially in terms of competition for EU subsidies and financial redistribution. If enlargement is to proceed, far-right parties will most likely seek financial measures to protect their countries’ local agriculture sectors, potentially complicating negotiations with new member states.
Donald Trump’s return to office: Transactionalism and EU enlargement process
Donald Trump’s return to the White House could introduce a new layer of complexity to the enlargement debate. A second Trump administration is expected to take a more transactional approach to transatlantic relations, prioritising bilateral deals over multilateral cooperation. This could weaken US-EU coordination on strategic issues, including enlargement.
A shift in US foreign policy could embolden nationalist and Eurosceptic leaders in both EU member states and the Western Balkans, who might exploit Trump’s rhetoric to stall necessary governance reforms for accession.
At the same time, far-right parties in EU member states may frame Ukraine and Moldova’s accession as a security and financial liability, arguing that these countries would place an additional heavy burden on the EU budget. This could further amplify public opposition to enlargement, particularly if far-right forces successfully disseminate their political narratives across the continent.
Looking ahead: Enlargement poised for further politicisation
In this context, the outcome of the upcoming German elections should be monitored closely by candidate states. Germany has always been a strong advocate and supporter of EU enlargement, but as far-right parties gain clout, its stance may harden, making the accession process much more difficult, especially given that a large share of its population opposes further enlargement. Even if the cordon sanitaire is maintained, the far-right’s capacity to influence policy narratives on migration, security, and sovereignty may result in harsher restrictions, longer delays, and a more unpredictable process for countries seeking to join the EU.
think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration is the pioneering initiative of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy – ELIAMEP, supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans