by Carlos Hernández-Echevarría and Salomé Petit from Fundación Maldita.es
It’s a well-proven fact that disinformation knows no borders and it’s not constrained by them. As such, a really effective response to it cannot be limited to a handful of countries. Nowhere is this more true than in Europe, where EU members and non-members alike confront similar threats.
Countries seeking EU membership in the Western Balkans, as well as Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, have become prime targets of Russian FIMI operations. Moreover, the FIMI operations in these countries largely aim at chipping away at the credibility of the EU, but also to sow distrust among their citizens regarding European democracy and rule of law.
Those narratives of weaponized distrust easily travel across nation lines and pose risks to the information integrity of both EU Member States and candidate countries alike. That being so, the Democracy Shield – the EU’s latest initiative to boost collective resilience against information manipulation and disinformation – would be ill-suited to rise to the challenge at hand if it doesn’t involve candidate countries.
Disinformation knows no borders
At Fundación Maldita.es we’ve experienced firsthand the cross-border nature of disinformation. In the ATAFIMI project we work hand in hand with fact-checkers in Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia to detect, monitor, and document FIMI narratives based on disinformation claims that spill over national lines.
One such case of disinformation spill-over is the tired tale of how the West finances the ‘colour revolutions’ and pro-European sentiments in the Eastern neighbourhood. This was infamously used to characterize the Euro Maidan protests and has been repurposed ever since, with claims popping up in Georgia and Serbia most recently. These examples come to show how a story crafted in one country can be endlessly reframed and recycled to be disseminated in another, reaching EU and candidate country audiences along the way.
The fact that different languages are spoken both inside and outside the Union also contributes to the blurring of border lines when it comes to transnational disinformation. Bosnian, Serbian, Montenegrin and Croatian – to name a few official languages from both EU and candidate countries – are so tightly inter-connected as to be mutually intelligible. And obviously there’s a very significant diaspora from many neighboring countries that lives, works, and often votes in the EU but is connected to the information ecosystem in their country of origin.
Neighbours are prime targets of FIMI, and the risk travels back to the EU
It is important to consider that when it comes to foreign interference, neighbouring countries are a key battleground for the authoritarian regimes bent on discrediting the European project,with their audiences being prime targets of state-run disinformation campaigns as much as those in the EU itself. This is especially true around election periods where Russia has a vested interest in parties amicable to the Kremlin winning. Take for instance the 2024 Georgian elections and the ‘global war party’ narrative or the Moldova elections in 2025 where pro-European parties were the target of Russian disinformation campaigns.
The accession aspirations of these countries also put the EU at a crosshair of anti-enlargement disinformation propagated by the Kremlin. EU integration is often portrayed as giving in to corrupted liberal Western values and anyone who supports accession is often depicted as a traitor of sorts, prioritising foreign interests above domestic ones. As a result, the EU can end up being perceived as a threat to national identity rather than as a partner.
It’s particularly important for candidate countries that will soon be part of the Union and have to harmonize
Strengthening civil society, media pluralism and fact-checking in candidate countries will also eventually result in a stronger Union when these countries eventually join. Some candidate countries have weak mechanisms for reporting illegal and harmful content to platforms and no adequate regulatory frameworks in place against disinformation roaming online. Putting the infrastructure in place to help bridge the digital rights gap will not only be part of candidacy countries’ accession process in the future – as they will have to align with EU’s digital rulebook – but can also create the scaffolding for effective implementation of those regulatory frameworks that rely on a cooperative environment involving trusted flaggers, a strong CSOs ecosystem, independent regulators and high degree of user empowerment.
Civil society organisations in the Western Balkans have long advocated for stronger platform accountability and a more structured involvement of the region in relevant EU mechanisms, including through regional efforts within the OSF-Western Balkans-supported Ignita initiative. Indeed, early alignment of candidate countries in EU disinformation strategy can ensure closer regional alignment and extended resilience by reinforcing a ‘first line of defence’ against threats to information integrity. Against this backdrop, the Parliament has called on the Commission and the European Union External Action Services (EEAS) to create ties with these nations in matters of information resilience, cybersecurity and hybrid threats in the form of sustained, funded long-term support through the establishment of regional hubs for countering threats to online information integrity and FIMI in Western Balkan neighbourhood.
This is especially important during high-risk events like elections, when accurate information is not only important but vital to the progress of candidate countries towards full EU integration. A more sustainable news media sector is also a basic precondition for their accession and for their citizens’ right to democratic engagement. Leaving these countries out of the Democracy Shield would not equally keep the risks outside the EU.