The past few weeks have reshaped global geopolitics.
The United States distanced itself from its longstanding strategic ally, the European Union. In just a few weeks, Europe was forced into a reality check.
After the Munich Security Conference, French President Emmanuel Macron called for an urgent summit with cherry-picked EU members in the aftermath of Munich and visited Washington D.C. European countries, along with Turkey and Canada, reconfirmed their unequivocal support for Ukraine’s resistance against Russia. Meanwhile, we are still waiting on Russia’s response to the brokered 30-day ceasefire by the U.S and Ukraine.
The imperialist nature of this geopolitical repositioning by redrawing borders without European input is alarming. But there is another vital question: what happens to the not-great powers, the small and larger countries in and out of EU(rope)?
The Western Balkans (WB) remains vulnerable to external influences from non-Western actors, despite warnings addressed to the EU for prompt and more thorough engagement in the region in line with its Enlargement policy. New developments in transatlantic relations and the newly established friendship between the US and the European far right on one side and Russia on the other, will have their own influence in the Western Balkans, and in the most adverse way for the European Union.
Rudy Giuliani, former New York City mayor and personal lawyer to President Trump, went to Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, to endorse Milorad Dodik (President of Republika Srpska) ahead of the verdict for his alleged defiance of decisions by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Prime Minister of North Macedonia, Hristijan Mickoski, earlier this month spoke at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Washington DC. The Serbian government maintains close ties with Richard Grenell, special envoy to Serbia and Kosovo, who openly criticised Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti. Finally, President Trump’s son-in-law concluded an agreement for the building of Trump Tower and visited Belgrade recently.
In light of recent events, the discussion on the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans seems marginal, as Europe needs an urgent adjustment to the meta narrative. Public support for EU accession of Western Balkans countries is only 35%. The protesters in Serbia are pointing towards the EU as a complicit to the democratic backsliding in the country. The urgent question is whether the EU will finally step up and deliver a concrete enlargement agenda for the Western Balkans?
Every state has the sovereign right to build partnerships and try to find its place in a rapidly changing world. The aforementioned countries have been stuck in a non-ending tunnel, torn between bilateral disputes and vague conditionality on basic principles such as the rule of law. This seems unprincipled given that a blind eye has been turned to the behaviour of some countries for a long time. But (and a large but at that), the EU remains a gatekeeper of the free world and Western liberal democracy as we know it. Standing with Ukraine is not just a political and moral commitment to the European continent but also a value itself. Forcing a neighbour to cede territory and succumb to imperialist ideals is the total opposite of where the Balkans should stand. The region’s disappointments with the EU are not unfounded. But siding with a country that would deny an entire nation’s existence, its language and sovereignty, is contradictory to the current political battles the Western Balkan countries are dragged into.
What can we expect in mid-term? Each of the countries, based on their own interests, will continue to nurture multiple relationships and make the best of them. Predominantly, the focus will be on economic development, security and political support. The primary challenge lies in the possible decline in the effectiveness of the EU’s carrot-and-stick conditionality mechanism. Countries that already struggle with rule of law, democracy and corruption will see no reason to continue with the democratisation and institutional reforms necessary for EU accession, because alternatives are being offered without being asked to do the “hard” homework. Instead, the interests of the governing elites will be prioritised, polarisation in societies will further deepen together and nationalism will turn into another security threat.
There is a regional legacy from the Non-Aligned movement, where a parallel could be drawn. We need the EU to offer that long-awaited perspective, otherwise we should expect more open policy towards the USA, Russia and China and commitment to a multi-vector diplomacy by the countries in the Western Balkans.
It would be a consequence of the EU ’s missed opportunity, but also boldness to act on its strategic goals and reluctance to reform and enlarge. With a delayed strategic autonomy, Ukraine’s prosperity at stake and the Western Balkans abandoning the road to membership, Europe will be left with an uncertain future, fragmentised and lonely.